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Abstract: In rhetoric and argumentation research studies of empirical audiences are rare. Most studies are speaker- 
or text focussed. However, new media and new forms of communication make it harder to distinguish between 
speaker and audience. The active involvement of users and audiences is more important than ever before. Therefore, 
this paper argues that rhetorical research should reconsider the understanding, conceptualization and examination of 
the rhetorical audience. From mostly understanding audiences as theoretical constructions that are examined 
textually and speculatively, we should give more attention to empirical explorations of actual audiences and users. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Probably no other European orator in modern times has been as extensively written about as 
Winston Churchill. John F. Kennedy famously said that Churchill “mobilized the English 
language and sent it into battle”, and it is often claimed that “it was the inspiring power of his 
speeches that kept up morale and ultimately led the Allies to victory” (Enright 2001, p. 12). In 
one biography John Kegan praises Churchill’s Dunkirk-speech to House of commons on the 
fourth of June 1940. We all know this speech: it is the one where Churchill promised that the 
British “shall go on to the end”: 
 
we shall fight in France, 
we shall fight on the seas and oceans, 
we shall fight with growing confidence 
and growing strength in the air, 
we shall defend our Island, 
whatever the cost may be, 
 
we shall fight on the beaches, 
we shall fight on the landing grounds, 
we shall fight in the fields 
and in the streets, 
we shall fight in the hills; 
we shall never surrender 
 
Kegan writes that this speech was “instantly celebrated”, and “evoked a surge of patriotic 
enthusiasm” (Kegan 2002, p. 125). It is said that Churchill, as he paused in the “great uproar that 
greeted these words”, muttered to a colleague next to him: “And we’ll fight them with the butt of 
broken beer bottles because that’s bloody well all we’ve got” (Enright 2001, p. 45). 
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 Well, nonetheless, there is no doubt that this kind of anaphoric repetition, plain language, 
and direct address through short sentences creates powerful rhetoric. As Churchill himself 
explained some years later, when critiquing the use of passives in speeches: 
 
What if I had said instead of “We shall fight on the beaches”, “Hostilities will be 
engaged with our adversary on the costal perimeter” (Enright 2001, p. 31). 
 
So, Churchill’s speeches are perhaps the best example we have of effective and successful 
rhetoric that made a difference and influenced an audience. Or is it? Research by Richard Toye 
from University of Exeter says otherwise (Toye 2013). Instead of just doing rhetorical criticism 
of Churchill’s speeches Toye has examined their reception. He has read the newspapers, and 
studied the Home Intelligence Reports in which the Ministry of information reported public 
opinion and reactions to specific events. 
 Furthermore, Toye has examined diaries where ordinary British people express their 
feelings and attitudes about Churchill’s speeches. In short: instead of conjecture and guesses, 
Toye examined actual response to the rhetoric he was studying. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom not everybody was persuaded, energized and inspired by Churchill’s oratory. 
 Many ordinary people met his oratory with dissent and criticism. Toye’s reception 
analyses documents that even though the speeches invigorated and exited many, others were 
disappointed and became depressed (Toye 2013). 
 The incorrect – or at least insufficient – view of the power of Churchill’s rhetoric is an 
example of the valorising of the single orator and of the outstanding rhetorical text, while 
neglecting of other voices, and overlooking the more complex circumstances that surround the 
rhetoric of our time. 
 Toye’s findings could not have been produced by textual analysis of speeches; only by 
studying empirical responses. Even if we acknowledge that Churchill was an outstanding orator 
– and he was – we will not really understand the rhetoric of his war speeches if we do not take 
into account the diversity of responses he evoked. 
 The message is pretty clear: if we really want to understand rhetoric and argumentation 
we have to understand audiences, we have to study how people receive, interpret, and respond to 
instances of rhetoric. 
 
2.  Audiences in rhetorical theory 
 
Of course no scholar of rhetoric would deny the importance of audience, because without 
audiences rhetoric would simply not exist. It is no coincidence that Aristotle used many words  
in his Rhetoric to account for emotions and different human characters and to define the speech 
genres in relation to the types of hearers (Aristoteles & Kennedy 2007). 
 Some of the most leading researchers of the revival of rhetorical research in the second 
half of the 20th century have contemplated on the role of audience in rhetoric. Most recently 
Christopher Tindale has explored audiences in The Philosophy of Argument and Audience 
Reception (2015). Much could be said about the rhetorical tradition of textual and speculative 
audience constructions, however, here it will suffice to mention Perelman and Olbrects-Tyteca’s 
New Rhetoric where the audience is defined as “the gathering of those whom the speaker want to 
influence by his or her arguments” (Perelman & Olbrecths-Tyteca 1971, p. 14). Who this 
gathering consists of is highly changeable, it can be the speaker himself, it can be a particular 
JENS E. KJELDSEN 
3 
audience, or it may be a universal audience. However it is difficult, The New Rhetoric says, to 
“determine by purely material criteria what constitutes a speaker’s audience” (Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, p. 19). Consequently not much ink is spilled on the notion of the 
particular audience and in The New Rhetoric audience is generally viewed as “a construction of 
the speaker” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971, p. 19). This is exactly how the universal 
audience – the most discussed audience in the theory of rhetoric and argumentation – is defined: 
a construction of the speaker.  In the same way Professor Tindale’s exploration in Argument and 
Audience Reception (2015) also primarily deals with theoretical or speculative audience 
constructions. 
 The accounts found in The New Rhetoric and in Argument and Audience Reception are 
representative of most of the rhetorical and argumentative approaches to audiences. In general 
the accounts have one thing in common: They are speculative, theoretical constructions of the 
audience. Audiences are either perceptions of the speaker, implied by the text, left out by the 
text, or constituted by the rhetoric (Black 2013, Wander 2013, Charland 1987; cf. Kjeldsen 
forthcoming/2016). All these texts provide extremely valuable rhetorical insights into how we 
may conceptualize rhetorical audiences. At the same time, however, they all illustrate a neglect 
of empirical audiences in rhetoric and argumentation. Very few scholars of argumentation deal 
with actual audiences or take into consideration any kind of real reception or factual response 
given by an existing audience. This is a pity, because as we learn from Toye’s study of 
Churchill’s rhetoric our limited focus on the study of discrete texts may not only prevent us from 
seeing what is actually there, it sometimes also makes us see what is actually not there. 
 Let me illustrate this with three short examples of studies that have benefitted from 
paying attention to reception and audience.  
 
3. Some insights can only be gained through empirical audience research 
 
As scholars of rhetoric Carole Blair and Neil Michel have done many studies on the rhetoric of 
memorials. However, when they visited the Kennedy Space Centre in Florida in order to do a 
rhetorical reading of the Astronaut memorial, the so-called Space mirror, they found themselves 
on unfamiliar ground. By listening to the visitors they quickly found out that other people did not 
share their reaction to the memorial. They were, as they write, “witnessing first hand what many 
rhetorical critics never attend to – a real audience” (Blair & Neil 1999, p. 46). Consider that: 
“what many rhetorical critics never attend to – a real audience”. From a textual point of view the 
memorial performs the “eulogistic operations that any commemorative monument must” (Blair 
& Neil 1999, p. 34). However, from observing and talking to visitors Blair and Michel found that 
most people were either so distracted by other features in the surroundings that they ignored the 
memorial altogether, or they just gave it a quick glance, wondered what it was and moved on. 
 We can perform elaborate readings and criticisms of memorials as rhetorical texts, but 
observing the actual reception – or lack thereof – certainly makes our intricate analyses seem 
rather disconnected to what is actually going on rhetorically. Through their observations Blair 
and Michel noticed something peculiar: Most people in the Kennedy Space Centre were wearing 
“Donald Duck shirts, Mickey Mouse ears, or Goofy hats” (Blair & Neil 1999, p. 47). It turned 
out that the overwhelming majority of visitors came from Walt Disney World, approximately 60 
kilometres away. 
 A trip to Disneyland helped the researchers understand the visitors’ reaction to the 
memorial: Disneyland is a theme park that structures the visitors’ experience as efficient fun, 
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safe adventure, impressive technology and happy endings. The visitors are given the role of 
recipients of entertainment. When moving from Disneyland to Kennedy Space Centre the 
visitors are generally met by a similar theme park structure. Even the signs on the parking lot 
look the same. So, the audience position of an effortless spectator constructed in Disneyland 
continues in the Space Centre. And this position is in conflict with the audience position of 
pensiveness and reflection required by the Space mirror memorial. When you are in theme-park-
mode it is difficult to enter a position of commemoration of the dead.  The rhetorical impact of 
the memorial simply could not be understood unless audience and context were taken into 
consideration. Rhetorically understanding the Space Mirror required observation, interviews and 
a visit to Disneyland 60 kilometres away. The study of the Space Mirror teaches us that 
sometimes, what is important to know; is not in the text itself. 
 We find another example of the fact that some rhetorical constructions cannot be located 
in the text in Kathleen Hall Jamieson’s study of political television advertising in the presidential 
campaign 1988 between Democrat Michael Dukakis and Republican George Bush sr. (Jamieson 
1992). This highly inflammatory campaign aired television spots attacking Michael Dukakis for 
being soft on crime. One was the infamous Willie Horton PAC-ad claiming that Michael 
Dukakis as Governor “allowed first-degree murderers to have weekend passes from prison”, 
while showing the dark, muddy picture of convicted murderer Willie Horton, who fled during a 
furlough and then kidnapped “a young couple, stabbing the man and repeatedly raping his 
girlfriend”. The Bush campaign followed up by releasing an ad stating that 268 people escaped 
during furlough, juxtaposing words and pictures in a way that invites the false inference that the 
escapees were first-degree murderers that went on to kidnap and rape. Finally, an ad with an 
interview with the couple Willie Horton had kidnapped and raped was released. The wife and her 
husband attacked Michael Dukakis, criticising him for his weak position on crime.  
 These three ads are distinct texts, we can make rhetorical analyses of each of them, but 
that will not really make us understand their rhetorical workings in the campaign as a whole. The 
ads were widely covered in both press and broadcasting, and short clips from them were often 
shown in news programs on television. Through focus groups and interviews Jamieson 
discovered that people had difficulties in discerning between the information they got from ads, 
news, speeches and other sources. The Bush ads invite the construction of a coherent story 
claiming that 268 black first-degree murderers had escaped during furlough and went on to do 
other crimes. This was not the case; only one convicted murderer had escaped, and that was 
Willie Horton. 
 However, Jamieson’s research interviews indicated that the respondents understood it 
otherwise. Out of the fragments of ads, news, speeches and other information viewers pieced 
together their own story; they constructed their own text. A text saying that Dukakis had let 268 
black Willie Hortons go free to kidnap and rape white people. These audience-constructed texts 
we will never find through traditional text analysis because they only exist in the mind of the 
audience. So, the only way we are able to access such texts are by talking to audiences. 
 Let me provide one last example of the value of reception-oriented studies in rhetoric. 
This kind of empirical approach is especially beneficial to the study of visual rhetoric and 
argumentation because such argumentation is fundamentally enthymematic, leaving most of the 
reconstruction of premises to the viewer. If we only approach visual argumentation through 
textual analysis, we run the risk of speculative reconstruction of arguments, because arguments 
are not only in the visual or multimodal text, but also in the context and in the viewer. 
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 Already in 1975 did Wayne Brockreide remind us that arguments are “not in statements 
but in people”, and that an “argument is not a ‘thing’ to be looked for but a concept people use, a 
perspective they take” (Brockreide 1992, p. 73). Now, more than 40 years later it seems that we 
have yet to take the full consequences of this fundamental insight. Somehow, we still seem to 
think that rhetoric and arguments are to be found in the text alone. But they are not. Of course 
something has to be in the text. If texts – of any kind – did not communicate anything, 
argumentation would be impossible. But that should not lead us to the misconception that 
everything is in the text. 
 Rhetoric and argumentation should not be viewed as product, but as process. I am not 
claiming that we should avoid textual analysis; of course not. This kind of rhetorical criticism is 
valuable because as experts, scholars have a unique ability to locate, organize and express 
arguments that are found in texts. However, as I have already suggested such an approach 
implies that rhetoric can be understood by looking at texts alone. Often it can’t. We have to take 
into consideration the context, audience, and reception. 
 Take this political advertisement from the Danish right wing, economically liberal party 
Venstre.1  
 
 
Political advertisement from the Danish political party Venstre. The ad was 
printed on November 15, in two weeklies during the Parliamentary election 
campaign in 2001. 
 
The ad was printed in two popular weeklies during the 2001 parliamentary election campaign in 
Denmark. Along the lower part of the ad there is a slim, blue rectangle, with the party logo 
placed in right hand corner, and a picture of the party leader, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, on the far 
left. Rasmussen was then the leader of the opposition party, after the election he became the 
Prime Minister of Denmark (2001-2009), and then General secretary of NATO (2009-2014). 
                                                 
1 This part is based on Kjeldsen (2007), where the full analysis of the mentioned ad and its reception is performed. 
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Rasmussen’s signature and printed name can be seen next to his picture. Above this, a press 
photo taken the year before constitutes the main part of the ad. It is a photograph and an issue 
well known to most Danes. 
 The photo shows seven people leaving a building, heading down the steps. Jackets and 
shirts cover their heads their faces are not visible. In the right hand part of the picture, we see a 
woman dressed in a black robe and a white headscarf. She seems to be holding one of the men by 
her right hand. Her left arm is stretched out towards someone outside the picture, while she 
performs an obscene gesture with her hand. These young men are second-generation immigrants 
from Palestine. In the spring of 2000, they were found guilty of a group rape of a 14-year-old 
girl. The woman is the sister of one of the men. They are leaving the courthouse in the city of 
Aarhus, after receiving their verdict – a verdict that was widely discussed and that the public 
considered much too lenient. 
 The text written in white across the picture proclaims “Time for a change”. Is there an 
argument here? What could that argument be? How and where should we look for the argument? 
We could ask the party leader, who is after all the responsible author of the message. He claimed 
in news-interviews that the ad was about crime and justice policy in general; it simply said that 
serious crimes should be punished harder. Is this what the ad argues? Obviously, something else 
is going on? 
 We could also do what we do mostly: analyse the ad and reconstruct the argument we 
find. But since the main part of the ad is just a picture showing something, we risk making a 
speculative construction of something that is not really there. After all, the ad contains neither 
premises nor conclusions. It is just a picture, two names and a short caption. So what then? If we 
should not try to find the argument by asking the author, and cannot reliably find it in the text; 
then where should we find it? If there is an argument, that is. 
 Well, there is an argument. I found it by examining 80 newspaper articles that mentioned 
the ad. Thirty-seven of these articles describe and discuss the advertisement itself (Kjeldsen 
2007). The key point here is that these articles implied or explicitly spelled out reconstructions of 
the claim and the argument presented visually in the ad. Although there were some differences in 
the interpretation of the ad, everybody assumed out-of-hand that the ad made an argument, and 
there was widespread accordance that this was the argument: 
 
Claim:  Refugees and immigrants are a problem for Denmark 
Backing: Take for instance the immigrants who performed a group- rape on a  
  young girl, and the contempt they showed us. 
Warrant: When members of a group (of people) cause problems 
  (such as rape and contempt), this group is a problem. 
  
This argument cannot be explicitly found in the ad, the author, Anders Fogh-Rasmussen, denies 
that this is the argument he created, but it is still the argument that most people perceived, so as 
scholars we would be foolish to insist that there is no argument. 
 Instead of claiming that we cannot use visual and multimodal communication to argue, 
we should take into consideration that people exposed to an ad like this one, actually perceive 
that the ad puts forward an argument. Furthermore: they tend to argue back. This counters two 
prevailing myths: The myths claiming that images cannot argue, and that people don’t argue 
back. The analysis of the news-discourse about the ad shows clearly images can make arguments 
and that we will argue back if they are used to claim something in which we disagree.  
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4.  Benefits and limits of empirical audience analysis  
 
These three examples illustrate how something that cannot be materially located in the text – be 
it a memorial, moving images or a newspaper ad – are still decisive for the impact of the rhetoric. 
 If we do not take this into consideration we will simply not be able to understand how 
rhetoric actually works. Empirical studies can provide us with a more nuanced understanding of 
rhetoric and argumentation because it teaches us what happens in the meeting between audience 
and rhetorical text. 
 The rhetorician Michael McGee famously claimed in the late 1990s that texts in a 
traditional sense do not exist in our contemporary world, and that “text construction is now 
something done more by the consumers than by the producers of discourse” (McGee 1990, p. 
288). I believe that we should still look at texts, however as my examples show, a good deal of 
the rhetorical texts we ought to examine are constructed in the minds of the audience, and the 
only way to access these texts is to observe, interview or somehow interact with the audience. 
 It is hard to define or locate the audience in the fields of rhetoric and argumentation 
research. Therefore, aspirations to examine audiences are sometimes countered with the 
argument that such studies are futile, because we cannot really know who the audience is. Trudy 
Govier, for instance, in her book The Philosophy of Argument, questions how much audience 
“matter for the understanding and evaluation of an argument”. She introduces the concept of the 
“Noninteractive Audience – the audience that cannot interact with the arguer, and whose views 
are not known to him” (Govier 1999, p. 183). 
 The mass audience, which is probably the most typical audience in the media society of 
our days, is “the most common and pervasive example of a Noninteractive Audience”. The views 
of this noninteractive and heterogenous audience, Govier says, are unknown and unpredictable 
(Govier 1999, p. 187). This means “trying to understand an audience’s beliefs in order to tailor 
one’s argument accordingly is fruitless” (Tindale 2013, p. 511). Consequently, “Govier suggests, 
it is not useful for informal logicians to appeal to audiences to resolve issues like whether 
premises are acceptable and theorists should fall back on other criteria to decide such things” 
(ibid.). 
 Ralph Johnson, continues this line of reasoning, and proposes that a Noninteractive 
audience is not only a problem for pragma-dialectics, as Govier suggests, but also for rhetorical 
approaches; because it is not possible to know this type of audience. Johnson criticises the views 
of Perelman and Christopher Tindale, which holds, “the goal of argumentation is to gain the 
acceptance of the audience” (Johnson 2013, p. 544). 
 Advising a speaker to adapt to the audience when constructing arguments, says Johnson 
“is either mundane or unrealistic” (Johnson 2013, p. 544). It is unrealistic because we cannot 
truly grasp an audience as an objective reality. Johnson is right in saying that grasping an 
audience, understanding and defining its identity, is a difficult matter. However, while this issue 
of the audience might be a problem for the speaker, I am not sure that it should cause so much 
anxiety for the researcher. 
 Because our most important concern, I think, should not be to determine the exact 
identity of the audience. In his new book professor Tindale seems to suggest the same, when he 
writes that issues of audience “identity present more challenges for argumentation than they offer 
benefits” (Tindale 2015, p. 28). I am not suggesting that researchers should stop speculating 
about what an audience is. I am saying that the primary concern for scholars of rhetoric and 
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argumentation should not be to determine the exact identity of the audience or settle whether or 
not an argument or another instance of rhetoric creates adherence. I think we should be more 
concerned with how an argument, or any rhetorical appeal, is constructed, how it is audience-
oriented, and – which is the main point in this paper – how it is received, interpreted, and 
processed – that is: how actual audiences actually respond to rhetoric: “We need to find out what 
people are doing with representations rather than being limited to making claims about what we 
think representations are doing to people” (Schiappa 2008, p. 26; cf. Stromer-Galley & Schippa 
1998). 
 
5.  Focus group research2 
 
One way of finding out what people are doing with representations is simply to talk to audiences. 
This is the best way to study how an argument may be received, interpreted, and processed. Such 
a method is especially important in multimodal communication, which has a dominantly visual 
and enthymematic character. Some may even claim that because of the visual dominance in 
multimodal communication we can never be sure what the argument is – or even if an argument 
is communicated at all. 
 However, if an empirical audience actually experience an argument, then surely an 
argument must exist and have been communicated. This is why I have done rhetorical reception 
studies of examples of commercial advertisements. Through focus groups I studied if 
respondents perceived arguments in the advertisements, and how they perceived them. For this 
project I used three focus groups. The three groups consisted of six pensioners in their 70s, five 
young women aged 18–19, and four university students who did not know each other. The 
groups were selected to allow for variation in life situation and breadth of knowledge. 
 One of the advertisements I showed the focus groups was this one for an Israeli 
bookstore: 
 
Steimatzky book chain ”Read more”. Courtesy of: Shalmor Avnon 
Amichay/Y&R Interactive Tel Aviv 
                                                 
2 This part is based on my previous publication “Where is visual argument” (Kjeldsen 2015). 
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When asking the respondents their thoughts about the ad they would say things like: “Read 
instead of watching TV” (MI/AN: 07:21); “You lose intelligence by watching television, because 
your head becomes smaller by that” (MI/AN 5:33); “it implicates that if you don’t read you will 
become stupid” (MA/BJ 08.32).3 Almost all respondents in some way created the argument:   
“Read more, because if you don’t, you will become  stupid”. It is clear that the respondents 
actually decode and experience an argument from the ad. And it is clear that the without the 
visuals the argument could not be constructed. 
 It is also clear that in reconstructing the argument the respondents do not talk specifically 
about the person in the picture. Instead they use general pronouns such as “one should read 
more”, or “you should read more”. They move from the specifics of the picture to a general level 
expressing a moral claim. It is obvious that the respondents construct the term “stupid” from the 
visual representation of the little head. In general, it seems possible to visually evoke adjectives 
such as big, small, stupid, and the like. 
 At the same time, we would probably be inclined to say, that images have a hard time 
evoking the conjunctions connecting the premises in an argument and creating the necessary 
causal movements for an argument to be established. What does conjunctions such as “therefor”, 
“hence”, and “then” look like? However, in my study respondents actually used conjunctions 
such as “because”, “then” and “therefor” both explicitly and implicitly. They also use 
formulations saying that the visual elements “implicate” certain conclusions.  Furthermore, the 
respondents explicitly mention the adversative conjunction “instead of”. Like the other 
conjunctions, the term “instead of”, and the way it is used to connect premises, is neither in the 
caption “read more”, nor represented anyway directly in the picture. 
 So, where does the conjunction come from? In making sense of the three central elements 
in the ad – the caption “read more”, the little head, and the person’s sitting-position with the 
remote – a connection has to be made. In light of the advertising genre the most relevant and 
plausible connection would be argumentative conjunctions. This kind of search for 
argumentative meaning is clear in the respondent’s interpretations. Take one of the pensioners, 
who said about the Steimatzky ad: “That you should read instead of watching television” 
(BR/UN 09:37). When I asked her to elaborate the woman said: 
  
Well, if it is an advertisement for a bookstore, then they obviously want to give a 
message saying that he needs to read more, right? And then, where is the message 
in that picture? That’s got to mean that his head is so small, that he needs to fill 
up. (BR/UN, 09:37) 
 
It is clear from this that she is not only searching to make sense of the ad by connecting verbal, 
visual, and contextual elements. She is also presupposing that the message has a persuasive 
character. Because of the imperative mood in the caption she immediately assumes that “read 
more” is the claim, and she naturally proceeds by looking for the reason (datum). Her short 
elaboration illustrates two things. Firstly, it illustrates that audiences are active in an exploring 
kind of mental labour, while looking for the meaning and the assumed argument in the 
multimodal ad. 
                                                 
3 This code marks the focus group, the identity of respondent, and the timeslot in the tape and the transcription for 
the utterance, e.g. (MI/AN: 07:21). 
JENS E. KJELDSEN 
10 
 This mental exploring is not incidental, I suggest, but is generally performed in 
accordance with pragmatic rules of speech acts (Austin 1975, Searle 1969), relevance (Sperber & 
Wilson 1986), and implicature (Grice 1989); theories which we know have been successfully 
applied to the study of argumentation in pragma-dialectics (e.g. Eemeren & Grootendorst 1983, 
Henkemans 2014). People obviously make implications and are consciously aware that the ads 
are trying to convey messages – even arguments. And they clearly try to reconstruct these 
arguments. 
 Secondly, the example illustrates that much more is going on in the reception of this kind 
of visual argumentation, than can be expressed by stating only the premises and conclusion of 
the argument. The picture, so to speak, holds much more than the content of these short 
assertions. It is an important characteristic of predominantly visual argumentation that it allows 
for a symbolic condensation that prompts emotions and reasoning in the beholder. In the focus 
group of students, for instance, a young woman commented on the ad in this way: 
 
if you do not read you will become a narrow-minded, couch-potato – non-
thoughtful. He is not exactly sitting in a position, which is considered very 
flattering, intellectual, positive. The whole position is connected with a sick 
person. (MA/SI 11:34) 
 
The basic argument: “Read more, because if you do not read you will become stupid” is clearly 
present in this comment, but the interpretation involves much more. It contains the emotional 
experience of being a couch-potato and the moral judgment that follows. Let me illustrate the 
significance of this visual surplus-meaning with another ad: namely this Norwegian ad for the 
tram-system in Oslo: 
Ad for the tram in Oslo: ”Unngå pinlige øyeblikk” (”Avoid embarrassing moments”). 
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Most respondents summed up the argument from this ad something like this: “Buy ticket, and 
you will avoid an unpleasant situation” (MV/MA 48:43). It should be clear that this ad indeed 
contains an argument. We could state the argument more formally like this: “You should buy 
tickets, because it will make you avoid an unpleasant situation.” However, if we reduce visual 
arguments to only these kind of context-less, thin premises, we limit ourselves to putting forward 
only the skeleton of the rhetorical utterance instead of the full body. We recreate, in a sense, a 
lifeless argument. 
 In contrast to this, it quickly became obvious, when I interviewed people about the ads 
that much more was going on. We see that the stating of the premises and the reconstruction of 
the argument is embedded in a much thicker understanding of the depicted situation, and of 
similar situations and emotions evoked by the ad. We discover that one of the benefits of visual 
or multimodal argumentation is that it provides what I call thick representations, a full sense of 
the situation, making an integrated, simultaneous appeal to both the emotional and the rational. 
One respondent said: 
 
Well, they are obviously playing on the embarrassment of getting caught when 
not having a ticket. The way you shrink yourself when the inspector comes. 
(MV/BJ 48:43) 
 
He later continued, saying: 
 
You try to hide a little, you want to sink into the ground; because it is so 
embarrassing to get caught, you make yourself as little as possible. (MV/BJ 
48:43) 
 
Another respondent elaborated even more on what she felt the ad represented: 
 
I am thinking that the person, the little man, has sneaked in. And when there is a 
ticket inspection, you always end up with those embarrassing situations, those 
looks, and you become embarrassed. Because it says, the text, “Avoid 
embarrassing moments. Buy tickets”. And then you would avoid being tense and 
get caught. And there are a lot of other people around that might think “Oh well, 
he got caught now”; and then you begin to think strange thoughts about the person 
that got caught. (MI/AN 31:15) 
 
The image clearly evokes imagined or previous experiences of embarrassment connected with 
sneaking on public transport. One person told that she herself had witnessed a “grown man” 
seemingly well enough off to pay the fare, but he still got caught without a ticket (MA/SI 48:43). 
Another vividly told about his fear and shame when he himself almost got caught without a 
ticket. All these descriptions and evoked emotions are, in fact, relevant parts of the argument. 
The more you feel the embarrassment, the more persuasive the argument will be. This, however, 
does not mean that the contribution of the image – or the ad as such – is just psychological and 
irrational persuasion. 
 It is true in this case that the argument is more or less fully expressed by words in the text 
in the upper left corner, which says “Avoid embarrassing moments. Buy a ticket”. However, the 
premises created by these words alone, lack the full sense of situation and embarrassment 
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experienced by the respondents, and expressed when they talk about the ad. So, if we limit 
ourselves to reconstructions of the argument with short premise-conclusion assertions we only 
get part of the argument expressed multimodally in the ad. Because the more I feel the 
embarrassment the more forceful the argument is. And – I would say – the more correct the 
argument actually is; because the feeling of embarrassment is an important part of the argument. 
If you do not really feel the embarrassment, then you have not really understood the argument, 
since the good reason offered to buy a ticket is the possibility to avoid an unpleasant feeling. Of 
course one could attempt to express this in writing by saying something like: “You should by 
ticket, because it will make you avoid a very unpleasant situation”. 
 However, adding modal modifiers to the premises does not truly capture the sense of 
embarrassment offered by the visual parts of the ad, and it is not likely to evoke the same kind of 
memories and vivid descriptions that the image clearly evoked in the respondents. My focus 
group study shows that audiences are actively involved in reconstructing arguments from 
pictures, creating premises and adding conjunctions. They move from the specific content in a 
picture to more general assertions, and their reconstruction is embedded in a condensed thick 
understanding of situations, experiences and emotions, that influence the character and the force 
of the argument.  
 
6.  Finding rhetorical argumentation in the multi-mediated society 
 
As my examples have illustrated, it is not only the audience that is hard to find and describe, so 
is the rhetorical text. In our time neither audience nor rhetorical utterances are discrete and 
clearly demarcated. This is one of the biggest challenges for contemporary rhetorical criticism 
and for the study of argument in society: because it has become increasingly difficult to 
determine what an audience have actually heard, seen, read, or in anyway experienced, of a 
specific rhetorical utterance. We may examine the arguments in a speech by president Obama, 
but no ordinary person will experience these arguments in the same way. 
 What most people get is a short excerpt in the news, the odd soundbite, a clip on 
YouTube, the retelling and explicit comments and evaluations of the speech by reporters, 
bloggers, friends, or colleagues. Most people never experience the text we examine as scholars. 
That puts us in a tight spot: There is no single, discrete text, and we don’t know who the 
audience is. However, as I have already suggested, we should not try to find the audience, as if 
there is only one. None of the studies I have mentioned attempted to find the one and only 
audience. Instead these studies looked at responses from an audience – or from several – in order 
to see what their specific acts of reception told us about rhetoric and argumentation. In all these 
examples, we learned something we otherwise wouldn’t have learned. 
 So what we should do in this fragmented, multi-media situation is not to look for the text, 
or to capture the identity of the audience. It is not only important to study what the rhetorical 
discourse is like and who the audience might be, but also – especially I would say – how 
rhetorical communication works. This is why approaches such as ethnographic participation, 
reception-analysis and focus group studies, are particularly relevant in the multi-mediated society 
of today; because these kind of approaches offer a way to understand the role of audience-
participation in argumentation and rhetoric. 
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7. Conclusion  
 
In this paper I have limited myself to talk about one research approach: audience analysis and the 
reception of rhetoric. But what I have said is part of a bigger picture. The lack of audience 
studies is just an example of the general lack of methodological variation in studies of rhetoric 
and argumentation. I have myself been trained as a humanistic scholar and I truly believe in the 
benefits of the humanistic, hermeneutic approach, and the close reading of texts. 
 Such research raise important questions and answer them in ways that increases our 
understanding of what rhetoric and argumentation is – of what a human being is. But we should 
not be methodological purists. We should use different approaches and we should combine them. 
The experimental research concerning the pragma-dialectical rules performed at the University 
of Amsterdam is one example of theoretical work being examined empirically. Frans van 
Eemeren and his colleagues go beyond theorizing about fallacies to an examination of how 
ordinary arguers actually view fallacious argumentative moves (Eemeren et al 2009). This is just 
one example of methods available. Other could be provided. 
 Argumentation and rhetoric concerns everybody, so we have an obligation to also move 
beyond theoretical speculations and find out how argumentation and rhetoric actually works in 
real life. Qualitative audience and reception studies are just one way of doing this. They are 
approaches we use far too seldom. So, we should more often go out and find the arguments in the 
audience. 
 
Acknowledgements: My sincere gratitude to the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation 
for inviting me as a keynote speaker at the OSSA 11 conference 2016. 
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